We are interested in risk constraints for infinite horizon discrete time Markov decision processes (MDPs). Starting with average reward MDPs, we show that increasing concave stochastic dominance constraints on the empirical distribution of reward lead to linear constraints on occupation measures. The optimal policy for the resulting class of dominance-constrained MDPs is obtained by solving a linear program. We compute the dual of this linear program to obtain average dynamic programming optimality equations that reflect the dominance constraint. In particular, a new pricing term appears in the optimality equations corresponding to the dominance constraint. We show that many types of stochastic orders can be used in place of the increasing concave stochastic order. We also carry out a parallel development for discounted reward MDPs with stochastic dominance constraints. The paper concludes with a portfolio optimization example.
Introduction
Markov decision processes (MDPs) are a natural and powerful framework for stochastic control problems. In the present paper, we take up the issue of risk constraints in MDPs. Convex analytic methods for MDPs have been successful at handling many types of constraints. Our specific goal is to find and study risk constraints for MDPs that are amenable to convex analytic formulation. It turns out that stochastic dominance constraints are natural risk constraints for MDPs.
Convex analytic methods are well studied for Markov decision processes. The linear programming approach for MDPs is pioneered in [30] , and an early survey is found in [3] . The main idea is that some MDPs can be written as convex optimization problems in terms of appropriate occupation measures. [5, 21, 6, 25] discuss a rigorous theory of convex optimization for MDPs with general Borel state and action spaces. Detailed monographs on Markov decision processes are found in [26, 27, 34] . Constrained MDPs can naturally be embedded in this framework. Constrained discounted MDPs are explored in [18, 19] . [1] is a substantial monograph on constrained MDPs. Constrained discounted MDPs in Borel spaces are analyzed in [22] , and constrained average cost MDPs in Borel spaces are developed in [23] . Infinite dimensional linear programming plays a fundamental role in both [22, 23] , and the theory of infinite dimensional linear programming is developed in [2] . The special case of constraints on expected utility in discounted MDPs is considered in [29] . MDPs with expected constraints and pathwise constraints, also called hard constraints, are considered in [32] using convex analytic methods. An inventory system is detailed to motivate the theoretical results.
Policies in MDPs induce Markov chains. Typically, policies are evaluated with respect to some measure of expected reward, such as long-run average reward or discounted reward. The variation/spread/dispersion of policies is also critical to their evaluation. Given two policies with equal expected performance, we would prefer the one with smaller variation in some sense. Consider a discounted portfolio optimization problem, for example. The expected discounted reward of an investment policy is a key performance measure; the downside variation of an investment policy is also a key performance measure. When rewards and costs are involved, the variation of a policy can also be called its risk.
Average reward MDPs
A typical representation of a discrete time MDP is the 5-tuple (S, A, {A (s) : s ∈ S} , Q, r) .
The state space S and the action space A are Borel spaces, subsets of complete and separable metric spaces, with corresponding Borel σ−algebras B (S) and B (A). We define P (S) to be the space of probability measures over S with respect to B (S), and we define P (A) analogously. For each state s ∈ S, the set A (s) ⊂ A is a measurable set in B (A) and indicates the set of feasible actions available in state s. The set of feasible state-action pairs is written K = {(s, a) ∈ S × A : a ∈ A (s)} , and K is assumed to be closed in S × A. The transition law Q governs the system evolution. Explicitly, Q (B | s, a) for B ∈ B (S) is the probability of visiting the set B given the state-action pair (s, a). Finally, r : K → R is a measurable reward function that depends on state-action pairs.
We now describe two classes of policies for MDPs. Let H t be the set of histories at time t, H 0 = S, H 1 = K × S, and H t = K t × S for all t ≥ 2. A specific history h t ∈ H t records the state-action pairs visited at times 0, 1, . . . , t − 1 and the current state s t . Define Π to be the set of all history-dependent randomized policies: collections of mappings π t : H t → P (A) for all t ≥ 0. Given a history h t ∈ H t and a set B ∈ B (A), π (B | h t ) is the probability of selecting an action in B. Define Φ to be the class of stationary randomized Markov policies: mappings φ : S → P (A) which only depend on history through the current state. For a given state s ∈ S and a set B ∈ B (A), φ (B | s) is the probability of choosing an action in B. The class Φ will be viewed as a subset of Π. We explicitly assume that both Π and Φ only include feasible policies that respect the constraints K.
The state and action at time t are denoted s t and a t , respectively. Any policy π ∈ Π and initial distribution ν ∈ P (S) determines a probability measure P π ν and stochastic process {(s t , a t ) , t ≥ 0} defined on a measurable space (Ω, F ). The expectation operator with respect to P π ν is denoted E π ν [·] . Consider the long-run expected average reward R (π, ν) = lim inf
The classic long-run expected average reward maximization problem is
It is known that a stationary policy in Φ is optimal for problem (2.1) -(2.2) under suitable conditions (this result is found in [34] for finite and countable state spaces, and [26, 27] for general Borel state and action spaces).
Stochastic dominance
Now we will motivate and formalize stochastic dominance constraints for problem (2.1) -(2.2). To begin, let z : K → R be another measurable reward function, possibly different from r. A risk-averse decision maker with an increasing concave utility function u : R → R would be interested in maximizing his long-run average expected utility lim inf
However, it is difficult to choose one utility function to represent a risk-averse decision maker without considerable information. We will use the increasing concave order to express a continuum of risk preferences in MDPs.
Definition 2.1. For random variables X, Y ∈ R, X dominates Y in the increasing concave stochastic order,
for all increasing concave functions u : R → R such that both expectations exist.
Let C (R) be the set of all continuous functions f : R → R. Let U (R) ⊂ C (R) be the set of all increasing concave functions u : R → R such that lim
for all x ≤ x 0 for some κ > 0 and x 0 ∈ R (the choices of κ and x 0 differ among u). The second condition just means that all u ∈ U (R) become linear as x → −∞. By construction, functions u ∈ U (R) are bounded from above by zero. We will use the set U (R) to characterize X ≥ icv Y . Now define (x) − min {x, 0}. We note that any function in U (R) can be written in terms of the family (x − η) − : η ∈ R . To understand this result, choose u ∈ U (R) and a finite set of points {x 1 , . . . , x j }. By concavity, there exist a i ∈ R such that a i (x − x i ) + u (x i ) ≥ u (x) for all x ∈ R and for all i = 1, . . . , j. Each linear function a i (x − x i ) + u (x i ) is a global over-estimator of u. The piecewise linear increasing concave function min i=1,...,j
is also a global over-estimator of u, and certainly
for all i = 1, . . . , j and x ∈ R. As the number of sample points j increases, the polyhedral concave function min i=1,...,j {a i (x − x i ) + u (x i )} becomes a better approximation of u. We realize that the function
} is equal to a finite sum of nonnegative scalar multiples of functions from
From now on, let Y be a fixed reference random variable on R to benchmark the empirical distribution of reward z. We assume that Y has support in a compact interval [a, b] throughout the rest of this paper. Define
to be the long-run expected average shortfall in z at level η. We propose the class of stochastic dominanceconstrained MDPs:
For emphasis, we index η over the compact set [a, b] in (2.4). Allowing η to range over all R would lead to major technical difficulties, as first observed in [9, 10] . Constraint (2.5) is a continuum of constraints on the long-run expected average shortfall of the policy π for all η ∈ [a, b]. We will approach problem (2.3) -(2.5) by casting it in the space of long-run average occupation measures. Then we will see that constraint (2.4) is equivalent to a stochastic dominance constraint on the empirical distribution of rewards z, namely
To be clear, lim T →∞ 1 T T −1 t=0 z (s t , a t ) indicates a random variable on R, not the long-run average of z (s t , a t ). We can denote the feasible region of problem (2.3) -(2.5) succinctly as
allowing problem (2.3) -(2.5) to be written as
where ρ * is the optimal value.
Remark 2.2. We focus on the average reward case in this paper. The extension to the average cost case is immediate. Let c : S × A → R be a measurable cost function. The long-run expected average cost is
Similarly, let z : S × A → R be another measurable cost function that possibly differs from c. Since z represents costs, we want the empirical distribution of z to be "small" in a stochastic sense. For costs, it is logical to use the increasing convex order rather than the increasing concave order. For random variables
for all increasing convex functions f : R → R such that both expectations exist. Define (x) + max {x, 0}, and recall that the relation X ≥ icx Y is equivalent to
Momentarily, let Y be a benchmark random variable that we require to dominate the empirical distribution of z. Define
. We obtain the cost minimization problem
The upcoming results of this paper all have immediate analogs for the average cost case.
A linear programming formulation
This section develops problem (2.3) -(2.5) as an infinite dimensional linear program. First, we discuss occupation measures on the set K. Occupation measures on K can be interpreted as the long-run average expected number of visits of a stochastic process {(s t , a t ) , t ≥ 0} to each state-action pair. Next, we argue that a stationary policy in Φ is optimal for problem (2.3) -(2.5). It will follow that the functions R (φ, ν) and Z η (φ, ν) can be written as linear functions of the occupation measure corresponding to φ and ν. These linear functions give us the desired linear program.
To proceed, we recall several well known results in convex analytic methods for MDPs. We will use µ to denote probability measures on K, and the set of all probability measures on K is denoted P (K). Probability measures on K can be equivalently viewed as probability measures on all of S × A with all mass concentrated on K, µ (K) = 1. For any µ ∈ P (K), the marginal of µ on S is the probability measurê µ ∈ P (S) defined byμ (B) = µ (B × A) for all B ∈ B (S).
The following two well known facts are ubiquitous in the literature on convex analytic methods for MDPs (see [15] for example). First, if µ is a probability measure on K, then there exists a stationary randomized Markov policy φ ∈ Φ such that µ can be disintegrated as µ =μ · φ whereμ is the marginal of µ. Specifically, µ =μ · φ is defined by
for all B ∈ B (S) and C ∈ B (A). Second, for each φ ∈ Φ and ν ∈ P (S), the probability measure µ = ν · φ on S × A satisfies µ (K) = 1 andμ = ν. Specifically, µ = ν · φ is defined by
for all B ∈ B (S) and C ∈ B (A).
We can integrate measurable functions f on K with respect to measures µ ∈ P (K). Define
as the integral of f over state-action pairs (s, a) ∈ K with respect to µ. Then
is the expected reward with respect to the probability measure µ and
is the expected shortfall in z at level η with respect to the probability measure µ. We need to restrict to a certain class of probability measures. For notational convenience, define r (s, φ) When µ is stable, the long-run expected average cost R (φ,μ) is
by the individual ergodic theorem [38, Page 388, Theorem 6] . Then for stable µ =μ · φ ∈ P (K), it follows that
Similarly, for stable µ =μ · φ, it is true that
To see the connection between problem (2.3) -(2.5) and stable policies, let I Γ be the indicator function of a set Γ in B (K). Define the occupation measure µ on K via
To continue, we introduce some technical assumptions for the rest of the paper. Let C b (K) be the space of continuous and bounded functions on K. The transition law Q is defined to be weakly continuous wheń
Assumption 3.2. (a) Problem (2.3) -(2.5) is consistent, i.e. the set ∆ is nonempty. (b) The reward function r is nonpositive, and for any
(
c) The function z (s, a) is bounded and upper semi-continuous on S × A. (d) The transition law Q is weakly continuous.
A function f on K is called a moment if there exists a nondecreasing sequence of compact sets
The next lemma reduces the search for optimal policies to stable policies. We define
to be the set of all stable probability measures µ that are feasible for problem (2.3) -(2.5).
Lemma 3.3. Suppose assumption 3.2 holds. For each feasible pair (π, ν) ∈ ∆, there exists a stable probability
Proof. For any (π, ν) ∈ ∆, there exists a stable policy µ =μ · φ such that
by [26, Lemma 5.7.10] . By the same reasoning,
e. the optimal value is attained. When an optimization problem is solvable, we can replace 'sup' and 'inf' with 'max' and 'min'. We use the preceding lemma to show that problem (2.3) -(2.5) is solvable.
Theorem 3.4. Problem (2.3) -(2.5) is solvable.
Proof. By lemma 3.3,
Now apply the proof of [26, Theorem 5.7.9] . Let {ǫ n } be a sequence with ǫ n ↓ 0 and ǫ n ≤ 1. For any ǫ n , there is a pair (π
By construction, µ n , r ≥ ρ * − ǫ n and ǫ n ∈ (0, 1) for all n, so inf n µ n , r ≥ ρ * − 1. It follows that sup n µ n , −r ≤ 1 − ρ * . Since −r is a moment, the preceding inequality along with [26, Proposition E.8] and [26, Proposition E.6] imply that there exists a subsequence of measures {µ ni } converging weakly to a measure µ on K. Now
holds since µ n , r ≥ ρ * − ǫ n for all n and ǫ n ↓ 0.
so we obtain ρ * ≤ µ, r .
Since µ, r ≤ ρ * must hold by definition of ρ * , the preceding inequality shows that µ, r = ρ * , i.e. µ attains the optimal value ρ * and is stable. By a similar argument,
. Thus, µ is feasible. Let µ * be the optimal stable measure just guaranteed, and disintegrate to obtain µ * =μ
and
From the preceding theorem, we can now write maximization instead of supremum in the objective of problem (2.3) -(2.5),
We are now ready to formalize problem (2.3) -(2.5) as a linear program. Introduce the weight function
on K. Under our assumption that r is nonpositive, w is bounded from below by one. The space of signed Borel measures on K is denoted M (K). With the preceding weight function, define M w (K) to be the space of signed measures µ on K such that
We can identify elements in M w (K) with stable policies, and vice versa. First, observe that the space M w (K) is contained in the set of stable probability measures. If
Conversely, if µ is a stable probability measure, then it is an element of
Also define the weight functionŵ
on S which is also bounded from below by one. The space Mŵ (S) is defined analogously withŵ and S in place of w and S × A.
Certainly, r ∈ F w (K) by definition of w since s, a) )) .
The two spaces (M w (K) , F w (K)) are called a dual pair, and the duality pairing is the bilinear form u, h :
, which is defined analogously with S andŵ in place of K and w.
We can now make some additional technical assumptions.
Notice that assumption 3.5(a) is satisfied if z ∈ F w (K). To see this fact, reason that
where the first inequality follows from
The linear mapping
is used to verify that µ is an invariant probability measure on K with respect to Q. The mapping (3.1) appears in all work on convex analytic methods for long-run average reward/cost MDPs. When L 0 µ (B) = 0, it means that the long-run proportion of time in state B is equal to the rate at which the system transitions to state B from all state-action pairs (s, a) ∈ K.
Lemma 3.6. The condition µ ∈ ∆ s is equivalent to µ, r > −∞ and
Proof. The linear constraints µ, 1 =´K µ (d (s, a)) = 1 and µ ≥ 0 just ensure that µ is a probability measure on K. The condition L 0 µ = 0 is equivalent to invariance of µ with respect to Q. For stable
], the conclusion follows.
Next we continue with the representation of the dominance constraints (2.4). We would like to express the constraints µ,
by definition of (x) − . It follows that
since µ is a probability measure.
The preceding lemma allows us to write the dominance constraints (2.4) as a linear operator in the space of continuous functions. Recall that we have assumed 
Define the linear operator
, which can be written as the single inequality
Since ρ * max {R (π, ν) : (π, ν) ∈ ∆ s }, and stable probability measures on K can be identified as elements of M w (K), problem (3.3) -(3.7) is equivalent to problem (2.3) -(2.5).
Establishing strong duality
In this section we apply infinite-dimensional linear programming duality to obtain the strong dual to problem (3.3) -(3.7). The development in [2] is behind our duality development, and the duality theory for linear programming for MDPs on Borel spaces in general.
We will introduce Lagrange multipliers for constraints (3.4), (3.5), and (3.6), each Lagrange multiplier is drawn from the appropriate topological dual space. Introduce Lagrange multipliers h ∈ Fŵ (S) for constraint (3.4) . The constraint µ, 1 = 1 is an equality in R, so introduce Lagrange multipliers β ∈ R for constraint (3.5). Finally, introduce Lagrange multipliers Λ ∈ M ([a, b]) for constraints (3.6). The Lagrange multipliers (h, β, Λ) ∈ F w (S) × R × M ([a, b] ) will be the decision variables in the upcoming dual to problem (3.3) -(3.7).
To proceed with duality, we compute the adjoints of L 0 and L 1 . The adjoint is analogous to the transpose for linear operators in Euclidean spaces.
where
Proof. (a) This result is well known, see [26, 27] .
When z is bounded on S × A, then
The Fubini theorem applies to justify interchange of the order of integration,
We obtain the dual to problem (3.3) -(3.7) in the next theorem.
Theorem 4.2. The dual to problem (3.3) -(3.7) is
allowing problem (3.3) -(3.7) to be expressed as
We rearrange the Lagrangian to obtain
Since β is unrestricted, take β = −β to get the desired form.
We write problem (4.1) -(4.3) with the infimum objective rather than the minimization objective because we must verify that the optimal value is attained. The dual problem (4.1) -(4.3) is explicitly
Since r ≤ 0, problem (4.4) -(4.6) is readily seen to be consistent by choosing h = 0, β = 0, and Λ = 0. Problem (4.4) -(4.6) has another, more intuitive form. In [9, 10, 12] , it is recognized that the Lagrange multipliers of stochastic dominance constraints are utility functions. This result is true in our case as well. Using the family (
for all x ∈ R. In fact, the above definition of u gives a function in C (R) as well. Define
to be the closure of the cone generated by the family
is the set of all utility functions that can be constructed by limits of sums of scalar multiplies of functions in 
Proof. Notice that the function
is an increasing concave function in x for any Λ ∈ M ([a, b]) with Λ ≥ 0. By using this definition of u, we see that for each state-action pair (s, a), s, a) ) .
Further, we can apply the Fubini theorem again to obtain
Next we verify that there is no duality gap between the primal problem (3.3) -(3.7) and its dual (4.1) -(4.3). All three dual problems (4.1) -(4.3), (4.4) -(4.6), and (4.7) -(4.9) are equivalent so the upcoming results apply to all of them.
The following result states that the optimal values of problems (3.3) -(3.7) and (4.1) -(4.3) are equal. Afterwards, we will show that the optimal value of problem (4.1) -(4.3) is attained, establishing strong duality.
Theorem 4.4. The optimal values of problems (3.3) -(3.7) and (4.1) -(4.3) are equal,
Proof. Apply [27, Theorem 12.3.4], which in turn follows from [2, Theorem 3.9]. Introduce slack variables α ∈ C ([a, b]) for the dominance constraints L 1 µ ≥ y. We must show that the set
is weakly closed (closed in the weak topology). Let (D, ≤) be a directed (partially ordered) set, and consider a net
where µ κ ≥ 0, α κ ≥ 0, and
since weak convergence on R is equivalent to the usual notion of convergence,
for all g ∈ Fŵ (S), and
We must show that (ν * , γ * , f * , ρ * ) ∈ H under these conditions, i.e. that there exist x ≥ 0, α ≥ 0, and ζ ≥ 0 such that
The fact that there exist µ ≥ 0 and ζ ≥ 0 such that
is already established in [27, Theorem 12.3.4] , and applies to our setting without modification. It remains to verify that there exists α ∈ C ([a, b]) with α ≥ 0 and f
for all η ∈ [a, b], establishing pointwise convergence. Pointwise convergence on a compact set implies uniform convergence, so in fact
, and notice that α ≥ 0 necessarily.
The next theorem shows that the dual problem (4.1) -(4.3) is solvable, i.e. there exists (h
When problem (4.1) -(4.3) is solvable, we are justified in saying that strong duality holds: the optimal values of both problems (3.3) -(3.7) and (4.1) -(4.3) are equal and both problems attain their optimal value. To continue we make some assumptions in line with [23] .
Assumption 4.5. There exists a minimizing sequence
(h n , β n , Λ n ) in problem (4.1) -(4.3) such that (a) {β n } is bounded in R, (b) {h n }
is bounded in Fŵ (S), and (c) {Λ n } is bounded in the weak* topology on M ([a, b]).
We establish strong duality next. To reiterate, strong duality holds when the optimal values of problems (3.3) -(3.7) and (4.1) -(4.3) are equal, and both problems are solvable.
Theorem 4.6. Suppose assumption 4.5 holds. Strong duality holds between problem (3.3) -(3.7) and problem (4.1) -(4.3).
Proof.
for n ≥ 0 be a minimizing sequence of triples given in the preceding assumption 4.5:
for all n ≥ 0 and
Since the sequence {β n } is bounded, it has a convergent subsequence with lim n→∞ β n = β * . ([a, b] ) is metrizable. By the Banach-Alaoglu theorem, it follows that {Λ n } has a subsequence that converges to some Λ * in the weak* topology, i.e.
Finally, since {h n } is bounded in Fŵ (S) we can define
for all s ∈ S. Then the function h * (s) is bounded in Fŵ (S), and
by Fatou's lemma. Taking the limit, it follows that (h * , β * , Λ * ) is an optimal solution to the dual problem.
The role of the utility function u in problem (4.7) -(4.9) is fairly intuitive. The function u serves as an additional pricing variable for the performance function z (s, a), and the total reward is treated as if it were r (s, a) + u (z (s, a)). Problem (4.7) -(4.9) leads to a new version of the optimality equations for average reward based on infinite-dimensional linear programming complementary slackness. 
Proof. There is a corresponding optimal solution (h * , β * , Λ * ) to problem 
which yields the second statement since µ
Variations and extensions
Multivariate integral stochastic orders
We extend our repertoire in this section to include some additional stochastic orders. Integral stochastic orders (see [33] ) refer to stochastic orders that are defined in terms of families of functions. The increasing concave stochastic order is an example of an integral stochastic order, because it is defined in terms of the family of increasing concave functions. We now give attention to some multivariate integral stochastic orders. So far, we have considered a z : K → R that is a scalar-valued function. In practice there are usually many system performance measures of interest, so it is logical to consider vector valued z : K → R n as well. For example, z (s, a) may represent the service rate to n customers in a wireless network. The empirical distribution lim T →∞ 1 T T −1 t=0 z (s t , a t ) is now a vector-valued random variable on R n . Recall the multivariate increasing concave stochastic order. For random vectors X, Y ∈ R n , X dominates Y in the increasing concave stochastic order, written
for all increasing concave functions u : R n → R such that both expectations exist. Unlike univariate ≥ icv , there is no parametrized family of functions (like (x − η) − ) that generates all the multivariate increasing concave functions. This result rests on the fact that the set of extreme points of the increasing concave functions on R n to R is dense for n ≥ 2, see [28, 7] . As in [13] , we can relax the condition X ≥ icv Y by constructing a tractable parametrized family of increasing concave functions. Let u (·; ξ) : R n → R represent a family of increasing concave functions parametrized by ξ ∈ Ξ ⊂ R p where Ξ is compact. Then, the family of functions {u (·; ξ)} ξ∈Ξ is a subset of all increasing concave functions and leads to a relaxation of ≥ icv . We say X dominates Y with respect to the integral stochastic order generated by {u (·; ξ)
for all ξ ∈ Ξ. For convenience, we assume u (x; ξ) is continuous in ξ ∈ Ξ for any x ∈ R n . We propose the multivariate dominance-constrained MDP:
using {u (·; ξ)} ξ∈Ξ . By the same reasoning as earlier, s, a) ). Certainly each function u (z (s, a) ; ξ) is continuous in ξ for any fixed s × a. Since µ is finite, it follows that the integral of u (z (s, a) ; ξ) with respect to µ is continuous in ξ.
Let C (Ξ) be the space of continuous functions on Ξ in the supremum norm,
We will express the dominance constraints (5.2) as a linear operator in C (Ξ). This operator depends on the parametrization u (·; ξ). The preceding lemma justifies defining
Also define the continuous function y ∈ C (Ξ) by y (ξ) = E [u (Y ; ξ)] for all ξ ∈ Ξ to represent the benchmark. The steady-state version of problem (5.1) -(5.3) is the modified linear program:
Problem (5.5) -(5.9) is almost the same as problem (3.3) -(3.7), except that now L 1 µ is an element in C (Ξ) to reflect the multivariate dominance constraint. We now compute the adjoint of L 1 , which depends on the choice of family {u (·; ξ) : ξ ∈ Ξ}. The parametrization u (·; ξ) will appear explicitly in this computation.
The Fubini theorem applies to justify interchange of the order of integration, s, a) ) .
The dual to problem (5.5) -(5.9) looks identical to problem (4.1) -(4.3) and is now explicitly
to be the closure of the cone of functions generated by {u (x; ξ) : ξ ∈ Ξ}. In this case U (Ξ) is a family of functions in C (R n ), the space of continuous functions f : R n → R. We see immediately that problem (5.10) -(5.12) is equivalent to
The variables u ∈ U (Ξ) in problem (5.13) -(5.15) are now pricing variables for the vector z. When our earlier assumptions are suitably adapted, then strong duality holds between problem (5.5) -(5.9) and problem (5.13) -(5.15). 
Discounted reward
We briefly sketch the development for discounted reward, it is mostly similar. Discounted cost MDPs in Borel spaces with finitely many constraints are considered in [22] . Introduce the discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) and consider the long-run expected discounted reward
We are interested in the distribution of discounted reward z,
We propose the dominance-constrained MDP:
We work with the δ−discounted expected occupation measure
Introduce Lagrange multipliers h ∈ Fŵ (S) for constraint L 0 µ = ν and multipliers
The form of the dual follows.
Theorem 5.4. The dual to problem (5.21) -(5.24) is
The optimal values of problems (5.21 This dual is explicitly
Problem (5.28) -(5.30) leads to a modified set of optimality equations for the infinite horizon discounted reward case, namely
for all s ∈ S.
Approximate linear programming
Various approaches have been put forward for solving infinite-dimensional LPs with sequences of finitedimensional LPs, such as in [24, 31] . Approximate linear programming (ALP) has been put forward as an approach to the curse of dimensionality, and it can be applied to our present setting. The average reward linear program (3.3) -(3.7) and the discounted reward linear program (5.21) -(5.24) generally have uncountably many variables and constraints.
ALP for average cost dynamic programming is developed in [8] . Previous work on ALP for dynamic programming has focused on approximating the cost-to-go function h rather than the steady-state occupation measure µ. It is more intuitive to design basis functions for the cost-to-go function than the occupation measure. For problem (3.3) -(3.7), we approximate the cost-to-go function h ∈ Fŵ (S) with the basis functions {φ 1 , . . . , φ m } ⊂ Fŵ (S). We approximate the pricing variable u ∈ U ([a, b]) with basis functions {u 1 , . . . , u n } ⊂ U ([a, b] ). The resulting approximate linear program is
We are justified in writing minimization instead of infimum in problem (5.31) -(5.33) because there are only finitely many decision variables. ALP has been studied extensively for the linear programming representation of the optimality equations for discounted infinite horizon dynamic programming (see [16, 17, 14] ). The discounted approximate linear program is 37) be a set of linear inequalities in the variables r ∈ R k indexed by an arbitrary set L. Let ψ be a probability distribution on L, we would like to take i.i.d. samples from L to construct a set W ⊆ L with sup r | γz,r +κz≥0, ∀z∈W ψ ({y : γ y , r + κ y < 0}) ≤ ǫ. 
Finite state and action spaces
The development for finite state and action spaces is much simpler. Now both problems (3.3) -(3.7) and (4.1) -(4.3) are usual linear programming problems with finitely many variables and constraints. The usual linear programming duality theory applies immediately to establish strong duality between these two problems.
For this section, let x denote an occupation measure on K to emphasize that it is finite-dimensional. Also suppose the benchmark Y has finite support supp Y = {η 1 , . . . , η q } ⊂ R, so that constraint (2.5) is equivalent to 38) by [9, Proposition 3.2] . Each expectation
For finite state and action spaces, the steady-state version of problem (2.3) -(2.5) is:
Duality for problem (3.3) -(3.7) is immediate from linear programming duality. As discussed in [34, Chapter 8] , the dual of the linear programming problem without the dominance constraints is min g
The vector h is interpreted as the average cost-to-go function. To proceed with the dual for problem (3.3) -(3.7), let λ ∈ R |Y| with λ ≥ 0 and consider the piecewise linear increasing concave function
with breakpoints at η ∈ Y. The above function u (ξ) can be interpreted as a utility function for a risk-averse decision maker. We define
to be the set of all such functions. Since Y is assumed to be finite, U (Y) is a finite dimensional set. 
Define the increasing concave function
by interchanging finite sums. So, the Lagrangian could also be written as
for u ∈ U . The dual to problem (5.43) -(5.42) is defined as
Rearranging the Lagrangian gives
so that the dual to problem (5.43) -(5.42) is
Since g and h are unrestricted, take g = −g and h = −h to get the desired result.
We used linear programming duality in the preceding proof for illustration. Alternatively, we could have just applied our general strong duality result from earlier. It is immediate that problem (5.45) -(5.46) is the finite-dimensional version of problem (4.7) -(4.9).
There is no difficulty with the Slater condition for problems (5.42) -(5.43) and (5.45) -(5.46) as there is in [9, 10] . In [9, 10] , the decision variable in a stochastic program is a random variable so stochastic dominance constraints are nonlinear. In our case, the decision variable x is in the space of measures and the dominance constraints are linear. Linear programming duality does not depend on the Slater condition.
The development for the discounted case is similar. In terms of discounted occupation measures x,
We compute the dual to problem (5.47) -(5.50) in the next theorem using the space of utility functions U from earlier. 
Portfolio optimization
We use an infinite horizon discounted portfolio optimization problem to illustrate our ideas in this section. A single period portfolio optimization with stochastic dominance constraints is analyzed in [11] . Specifically, the model in [11] puts a stochastic dominance constraint on the return rate of a portfolio allocation. We use this model as our motivation for the dynamic setting and put a stochastic dominance constraint on the discounted infinite horizon return rate. Suppose there are n assets whose prices evolve according to a discrete time Markov chain. We can include a risk-less asset with a constant return rate in this set. The asset prices at time t are p t = (p t (1) , . . . , p t (n)) ∈ R n , where p t (i) is the price per share of asset i at time t. The portfolio at time t is captured by x t = (x t (1) , . . . , x t (n)) ∈ R n , where x t (i) is the quantity of shares held of asset i at time t. For a cleaner model, we just treat each x t (i) as a continuous decision variable. We require n i=1 x t (i) = 1 and x t ≥ 0 for all t ≥ 0, there is no shorting. The total wealth at time t is then p t , x t .
At each time t ≥ 0, the investor observes the current prices of the assets and then updates portfolio positions subject to transaction costs before new prices are realized. Let a t ⊂ R n be the buying and selling decisions at time t, where a t (i) is the total change in the number of shares held of asset i. Define A (p, x) {a ∈ R n : x (i) + a (i) ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n,
to be the set of feasible reallocations given prices and holdings x. The constraint n i=1 p (i) a (i) = 0 requires the total change in wealth from buying and selling decisions to be zero in any period. The system dynamic for portfolio positions is then x t (t + 1) = x t (i) + a t (i) , i = 1, . . . , n, t ≥ 0.
(6.1)
The transaction costs c : A → R are defined to be
this cost function is a moment on S × A. The overall return rate between time t and t + 1 is z (p t , x t ; p t+1 , x t+1 ) p t+1 , x t+1 − p t , x t p t , x t .
We make the reasonable assumption that z (p t , x t ; p t+1 , x t+1 ) is bounded for this example. We want to minimize discounted transaction costs
  subject to a stochastic dominance constraint on the discounted return rate. Define
δ t (z (p t , x t ; p t+1 , x t+1 ) − η) − to be the expected discounted shortfall in relative returns at level η. We introduce a benchmark Y for the discounted return rate, and we suppose the support of Y is bounded within [a, b] . In this example, the benchmark can be taken as any market index.
We absorb the system dynamic (6.1) into a transition kernel Q. Our resulting portfolio optimization problem is then In the linear programming formulation of (6.2) -(6.3), we simply augment the state space and consider occupation measures over sequences (p t , x t , a t ; p t+1 , x t+1 , a t+1 )
to correctly compute z.
Conclusion
We have shown how to use stochastic dominance constraints in infinite horizon MDPs. Convex analytic methods establish that stochastic dominance constrained MDPs can be solved via linear programming, and have corresponding dual linear programming problems. Conditions are given for strong duality to hold between these two linear programs. Utility functions appear in the dual as pricing variables corresponding to the stochastic dominance constraints. This result has intuitive appeal, since our stochastic dominance constraints are defined in terms of utility functions, and parallels earlier results [9, 10, 12] . Our results are shown to be extendable to many types of stochastic dominance constraints, particularly multivariate ones. There are three main directions for our future work. First, we will consider efficient strategies for computing the optimal policy to stochastic dominance constrained MDPs. Second, we would like explore other methods for modeling risk in MDPs using convex analytic methods. Specifically, we are interested in solving MDPs with convex risk measures and chance constraints with "static" optimization problems as we have done here. Third, as suggested by the portfolio example, we will consider online data-driven optimization for the stochastic dominance-constrained MDPs in this paper. The transition probabilities of underlying MDPs are not known in practice and must be learned online.
